Albanian Democracy is Dying
Sean Boyle / Sept 23 / Politics
Albania’s democracy is sitting on a precipice.
Political divisions have left the country divided and hostile. Its Prime Minister currently stands accused of electoral fraud, voter manipulation and involvement in criminal activity, while his political opposition are 16 months into a national boycott of the country’s parliamentary system.
Inter-state collectives such as the US and EU have failed to take decisive action. Their choice to adopt a ‘hands-off’ approach has proved ineffective at resolving the developing political crisis, which has been further debilitating to Albania’s increasingly fragile democratic infrastructure. With Balkan geopolitics being increasingly of interest to major world powers, the situation developing throughout the country has the potential to evolve into an international incident and trigger the next flashpoint of EU – Russian relations.
The State of Albanian Politics
Albania has two major political parties. The Socialist Party of Albania (SPA), led by Edi Rama holds the current majority. Their victory in the 2017 general election was marred by rumours of electoral fraud and has been the subject of dozens of nation-wide anti-government protests over the past three years. The largest opposition party, the Democratic Party of Albania (DPA) is led by Lulzim Basha, a long-term critic of the Rama administration and unofficial leader of the Albanian anti-government coalition.
The fragile peace between the parties came to a dramatic end in the July of 2019, after the German tabloid Bild released several wiretap tapes containing recordings of government officials discussing the best way to falsify voting records in the (then) upcoming 2017 general election. The tapes included audio from Rama, the former Minister of Energy Damian Gjiknuri and the former Minister of the Interior Saimir Tahiri – all members of government who had been targets of the widespread anti-government sentiment in earlier months. Basha alongside 40 other members of Albania’s political opposition had already resigned their parliamentary mandates as part of a governmental boycott back in February; and elected to extend their protest indefinitely until Rama resigned as Prime Minister and granted the people free elections. Since then, Albania has been a non-functioning democracy, with a considerable proportion of its citizens and elected officials abstaining from the political process.
The political stalemate has done significant damage to Albania’s international standing and likelihood of successful application for EU candidacy. With such a large portion of his opposition absent, Rama has been able to comfortably defeat any proposed legislation that is not in direct service of his domestic agenda. Anti-corruption efforts, a more transparent electoral system and an integrationist economic policy with Europe have fallen by the wayside. 2019 saw Albania drop 9 places on the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index following a surge in bribery, fraud and organised crime; while its ‘below average’ conditions required to apply for EU candidacy have risen fivefold. Rama has since denounced Albanian media as promoting fake news, condemned political rivals as unpatriotic and disregarded the few localised examples of voter fraud that have been proven as “isolated incidents”.
Rather than pursue closer relations, both the EU and US have withdrawn financial support and reduced political pressure on Rama. France and the Netherlands in particular have objected to further EU engagement with Albania until its rising corruption and civil unrest is on the decline.
The Wider Geopolitical Significance
The rise of Rama’s authoritarian style of governance in Albania is important for several reasons. Firstly, it showcases how ineffective the current EU strategy in tackling domestic corruption in emerging democratic powers is. Secondly, it demonstrates that the rise of the ‘Democracy-Lite’ style of state governance is no longer limited to outside that of the Balkan/European borders.
The approach of France and the Netherlands is practical only in the short-term. To their credit, they stop the EU engaging with a nation that has a deteriorating economy, high likelihood of needing a bailout and with limited resources to offer the wider trade bloc. Giving Albania time to ‘sort itself out’ diminishes the need for direct EU intervention in the affairs of sovereign nation and further reduces the potential geopolitical firestorm that could erupt if Russia should feel its sphere of influence is being encroached on.
On the flip side, failing to apply pressure on Rama to rectify his supposed political corruption and negligent governance ensures Albania’s domestic unrest will only increase. The current political stalemate generates no positive outcome for Albania, the Balkans or its European neighbour states. The withdrawal of EU socio-economic integration ensures that Albania’s GDP will continue to remain low, its migration rate will remain high, and the country will continue to lack the skilled craftsmen and young business necessary to escape the economic malnourishment it endured under Soviet rule. With their democratic infrastructure less than half a century old, allowing their Democratic Model to wither and die effectively guarantees that Albania will never succeed in obtaining its EU membership, and the Albanian people’s trust in democracy may be irreversibly damaged. Again, while this may not be a huge loss to the 28 EU member states, external strategic threats may capitalise on such their abandonment to seize a foothold further into the continent.
‘Democracy-Lite’ states have been on the rise in recent years. Turkey and Russia are both quasi-European states that present the façade of adhering to the basic tenants of the Democratic Model – free elections, free media and human rights - while providing their citizens nothing of the sort. Such forms of governance are inherently dangerous to functioning democracies, as they increase the risk of dictatorial leaders emerging, provide smokescreens for domestic abuses of human rights and inspire fellow authoritarian leaders to adopt similar characteristics.
Rama is on track to follow Putin’s example. His 2020 Anti-Corruption Bill, which was designed to reduce the authenticity of his administration’s corruption allegations, was rejected by state judges on the grounds that it would violate citizens human rights if enacted. The legislation would have given authorities power to arrest citizens without evidence, search property without warrants and tap private communications on the basis of suspicion of ‘corruption’. When placed in context of Albania’s deepening political partisanship such a bill would serve as enough justification for the monitoring and imprisonment of any political dissidents deemed ‘suspicions’ and a threat to the state. Such measures were implemented by Putin back in 2007, with disastrous results for Russia’s political freedoms.
What the Future Holds
Collectively, both factors suggest that further political divisionism and further deviation from the Democratic Model is to be expected from Albania. Rama continues to decry his political opponents across social media, while Basha and other opposition leaders denounce him as a fraud, traitor and a criminal. The EU has already distanced itself as far from the situation as it can afford to. The Covid-19 pandemic and escalating tensions with Belarus and Russia have only served to further redirect international attention.
Political-economic integration with the Western Balkans is essential to ensure the long-term strategic security of Eastern Europe. Should Albania complete its transformation to a ‘Democracy-Lite’ state, the challenge to return its politicians, local leaders and voting public to the Democratic Model will have increased exponentially. The choice European geopolitical actors now face is whether they want to assist an ally today, or face a new enemy tomorrow.